According to the source, headlines about Saudi Arabia’s first quantum computer have raised concerns about whether BTC can be broken, but current devices lack the large-scale, fault-tolerant logical qubits needed to run Shor’s algorithm against Bitcoin’s secp256k1 ECDSA at practical speeds, keeping immediate quantum risk low for traders; source: NIST 2022 PQC selections; IBM Quantum roadmap 2023–2024; National Academies 2019. Breaking a single 256-bit ECDSA key is estimated to require thousands of logical qubits and over 10^9 T-gates, implying millions of physical qubits with surface-code error correction—orders of magnitude beyond today’s hardware; source: Roetteler et al. 2017; Fowler et al. 2012; Gidney and Ekerå 2019. Bitcoin only reveals a public key when coins are spent, so UTXOs in non-reused addresses remain shielded from quantum key-recovery until broadcast, concentrating any near-term vulnerability on exposed or reused keys; source: Antonopoulos, Mastering Bitcoin (2nd ed.); Aggarwal et al. 2017. For positioning, treat quantum as a monitoring catalyst rather than an immediate tail risk, and watch credible milestones such as thousands of stable logical qubits and NIST’s PQC FIPS finalization that would signal migration timing; source: NIST 2024 draft FIPS 203/204; National Academies 2019. If a cryptographically relevant quantum computer emerges, assets tied to exposed public keys and reused addresses would face the earliest risks, reinforcing UTXO hygiene and readiness to upgrade wallets once PQC paths are standardized; source: Aggarwal et al. 2017; Bitcoin developer documentation.